Drones, Nord Stream and international speculation

Since the sabotage on the Nord Stream pipelines on September 26 I have, as a result of my work on under water capability, maritime systems, threat and risk management, defence capability and emerging technology, been heavily contacted by Swedish and international media. The questions often relate to what are likely explanations to what we have seen and to what the different investigations find. At least two large challenges remain: the information is still limited and the approach used for the sabotage may have been one of the unlikely ones.

I have noticed that the knowledge on what is technically possible and what that means in terms of possible sabotage approaches as well as feasible protective measures is low. This creates large challenges especially if we want to act proactively on future threats and not just focus on the things that already has happened.

Therefore I want to promote the Master’s program Innovation, Defence and Security, if you want to contribute to creating solutions for a safer world. Next time to apply is no later than January 16.

Read more here and make the society’s defence and security your business!

The Master’s programme Innovation, Defence and Security provides you with a systems understanding of the systems that contribute to a society’s defence and security. You will study how these systems are developed and used, and how organizations and technical components interact.

The program is interdisciplinary with a sociotechnical perspective and the program focus on problem-solving.

Or are you looking for a journal article, read this one on military organisations and emerging technologies and how unmanned systems find a role in future navies by Therese Tärnholm and Hans Liwång in Journal of Military Studies.

References

Tärnholm, T. & Liwång, H. (2022). Military organisations and emerging technologies – How do unmanned systems find a role in future navies? Journal of Military Studies. https://doi.org/10.2478/jms-2022-0004

Styrishave, N. (18 Nov 2022). Svenske efterforskere finder rester af sprængstof og bekræfter sabotage på Nord Stream. dr.dk.

Mackrael, K. & Hirtenstein, A (18 Nov 2022) Explosives Found in Vicinity of Nord Stream Blasts, Sweden Says. wsj.com.

Need to dig deeper to find out more about drone incidents

The Swedish Chief Prosecutor has now commented on the drone incidents over Swedish nuclear plants in January 2022. This after that the preliminary investigation has been discontinued because they have not been able to tie any person or organization to the incidents. Additionally, the police has not been able to establish if the flights were initiated by another state or not. However, they state that:

- In some of the cases, it has been established that this are professional drones or drones used for industrial use. This is based, among other things, on the speed and size of the drones.

They therefore rule out hobby pilots. I am personally skeptical to this finding, given the limited information the police have nothing can be ruled out. The knowledge and power of hobbies is impressive, the finical power and knowledge needed for the hobby pilot to hack commercial professional drones or to build your own “professional drone” is accessible to enough people. I may also argue that such a hobby is more constructive and less risky than for example illegal street racing (which is something we know is happening).

Drones is an example of technology that blur the lines, not only between civilian and military, but also between prank and military violation, and between the so called military operating domains air, land, cyber, electronic warfare and cognition etc. This is very much proven by the non-professional, but very capable, Aerorozvidka group in Ukraine supporting the Ukraine defense forces with drone operations. This is a fact known by military powers, but our thinking is still too much fixed in a past where it was fruitful to draw lines between military and civilian technology. Without more information gathered at the instance of a drone flight, the possibility to find the person or organization responsible and the intent is down to extreme luck. At least two things are needed:

• Increase the risk involved for the person or organization behind the incidents (so that fewer are prepared to take the risk and the number of possible suspects are reduced).
• During the flight gather more information about the drone, its activity, and the takeoff and landing site(s).

The first bullet point can be supported by the second, but also potentially by taking down the drone (in a way that pose a low risk to others).

For a civilian, but valuable and strategic, and stationary installation such as a nuclear power plant installing systems that automatically can gather more information at the time of a drone incident is possible and feasible. The system should be able to detect small flying objects, but also to record any signals from or to the drone. Only with this extended information, about signals, type of signals or absence of signals, is it possible to classify the drone and to say something about the intent of the flight. It will also increase the possibility to act against the persons launching or retrieving the drone.

This text draw from the following sources:

• Swedish news reports on the drone flights over Swedish nuclear plants in January 2022, especially Filmer visar dronare över svenska karnkraftverk.
• International news reports on the Aerorozvidka group, their activity and their drones.
• Black, J., Lynch, A., Gustafson, K., Blagden, D., Paille, P., & Quimbre, F. (2022). Multi-Domain Integration in Defence, Conceptual Approaches and Lessons from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea (p. 97). RAND Europe.

Defense development: The role of co-creation in filling the gap between policy-makers and technology development

There is a gap between policy-makers and technology development. This gap leads to risks concerning nontechnical system properties and ineffective interactions between technical and social components.

My study investigates co-creation between government, industry, and academia and how nontechnical system properties and interactions between technical and social components are considered in the early phase design of systems for security and defense. Co-creation is here understood as a specific form of research collaboration facilitating results that would not have been possible without a joint approach between policy-makers and technology development. Throughout the analysis, an example of AI and air defense is used as a case to exemplify the challenges and solutions discussed.

The study analyses how higher education institutions can create an arena for relevance, rigor and design joining the hard perspectives of the industry with the soft perspectives of policy, social and critical sciences. The study identifies that involved parties must acknowledge the need for a pragmatic relationship to traditional scientific traditions to capture the multitude of perspectives present. It is identified that the proposed co-creation can contribute to articulating societal challenges, conflicting values, and alternative design principles into the solution at early concept design phases.

Co-creation could also be an arena for joint development of the more specific design approaches needed for later design steps. However, this contribution depends on an openness to the challenges and knowledge gaps and that higher education institutions maintain their autonomy.

Read more, cite and download the article: Hans Liwång (2022) Defense development: The role of co-creation in filling the gap between policy-makers and technology development. Technology in Society 68, 1-10, 101913, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2022.101913.

(I would translate "research co-creation" into "forskningssamverkan" in Swedish)

Drones over Swedish installations of importance

I’ve, during the beginning of 2022, been involved in the discussions on the implications of that drones, and sometimes big drones, have been sighted above Swedish installations of importance such as such as nuclear plants and the Royal Castle.

About this much can be said and the reasons for these incidents are so far not uncloaked and may remain so. Most often unsuitable drone flights are a result of mistakes and not antagonistic intent. However, it cannot be assumed that is the case also these times.

Compared to traditional threats there are some important aspects that govern drone incidents.

• No borders between civilian and military activity.
• Low entry cost/effort.
• Low risks associated with the operation.

These three aspects lead to that the number of potential persons and organizations that has the capability and possibility to perform an attack are many and varying.

For many installations drones does not pose a particularly potent threat, but the possible high frequency of drone flights and incidents still lead to that the problem needs to be taken seriously.

It is only one of the three aspects above that can be affected by protection and that is to increase the risk associated with antagonistic drone flights. Such protections measures during peace time need to be implemented with low cost and low risk to other activity and third persons. The measures also need to be effective. To be able to early detect, disturb and jam drones can potentially change the number of incidents drastically. For some events and sites such measures are standard.