Ship security analysis - the effect of ship speed and effective lookout

Abstract

The threat of piracy to commercial shipping is a concern for the protection and safeguarding of human lives, property and environment. Therefore, ships under piracy threat should follow security measures suggested by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somali. It is, therefore, important to choose the proper security measures for the right situation.

This study presents a simulation model that can be used for probabilistic risk assessments regarding the operation of commercial ships. This investigation specifically studies the pirate approach phase and quantifies the effect of ship speed and effective lookout. The purpose of introducing probabilistic risk assessment into the analysis of pirate attacks is to meet safety goals more effectively through a well-balanced combination of proactive and reactive measures whilst keeping focus on the intended over all purpose of the particular ship.

The study presents collected and documented knowledge regarding pirate capability, intention and likelihood to perform attacks. The knowledge is collected from experts with experience from the situation off the Horn of Africa. The collected information is input to an influence analysis that identifies the network of influences that govern the skiff approach. The simulation model describes piracy characteristics and decision making on the threatened ship, the characteristics and countermeasures of the ship under attack, as well as weather.

Based on a comparison with available statistics the overall conclusion of the work is that the threat analysis and the simulation model can quantify and explain how the studied risk control options affect the probability of a successful approach. The result therefore exemplifies how a quantified ship security analysis can support the recommendations in industry guidelines and also enable recommendations that to a greater extent can facilitate an educated decision by the ship operators.

Authors
Hans Liwång, Chalmers University of Technology and the Swedish National Defence College
Jonas W. Ringsberg, Chalmers University of Technology

The study is presented at the 32nd International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering (OMAE2013) in Nantes, June 9-14 2013, Session: 2-44 Risk Analysis and Safety Management 3.

Armed guards off Somalia lead to problems

There is at the moment in Swedish media (and hopefully IRL as well) a discussion about problems with security companies used to protect ships from pirates. There are reports of fishermen being killed by armed guards on ships and that the companies lead to arms smuggling and more, in short; the many security companies in the area lead to problems of them self. I’m not that surprised and have heard similar rumours the last couple of years. The one thing I’ve noticed the most in my research is that the high involvement of security companies has affected the incident reports negatively. I think the effects on reports are a symptom of the same thing: some of the companies are not that interested in telling the world about how they work and the ship owners hiring them understand why.

When I about two years ago had a brief discussion with the person investigating the possibility to regulate the use of armed guards on Swedish ships (as a protection against pirates) I suggested that there should be a risk analysis that looked in to the potential gain with the regulation versus the potential problems with such a regulation. As I understand there never was one, the suggested law is based on the legal possibilities. However the law says (as IMO recommends) that the ship owner should do a risk analysis before taking the decision about hiring armed guards. This leads to two problems:

(1) There is a big difference in a risk analysis for a ship and an analysis of the industry/business of armed guards on ships. In the analysis for the ship such things as dead fishermen and arms smuggling by security companies are not consequences included in the analysis.

(2) There is no (good and well thought through) guideline for how ship owners are to do the risk analysis and how and to what extent the analysis should be audited. There is a possibility that a useless analysis fulfils the requirements.

The result is a multinational business on the waters off Somalia without any real control and too many without enough ethics. I’m convinced that there are good security companies and serious ship owners, but for every month without control there is a risk that the good percentage will decrease.

Every wave encounter is unique (and potentially powerful)

Lately I’ve been dealing a lot with uncertainties, both stochastic and knowledge based, as well as the effects of waves on floating constructions. As a result I’ve reflected on what could be seen as an unpredictability of the maritime domain.

The shape (including height and so on) of waves at sea are stochastic, there are theories about the probability distribution but not necessary perfect ones. So there is both a natural (never ending) variation of waves (aleatory uncertainty) and the fact that we don’t know exactly how this variation looks like (epistemic uncertainty). So in short, every wave is unique and there is no way of measuring it after it has hit the ship. The wave was the product of that instance and place and can never be recreated.

Another interesting or daunting aspect of waves is the high level of energy (as a result of the density of water) and how effortless it can be transported for long distances (which lead to the highest waves were many waves combine to a monster wave). Terrifying results from waves has been seen as results of both tsunamis and monster waves suspected to sink ship without a trace.

The situation isn’t the same for other areas, they have their set of uncertainties (aleatory and epistemic).

So should we give up and say that we know nothing of the future at sea, off course NOT! But we have to be better at understanding and dealing with the uncertainties (aleatory and epistemic). We have to take decisions (about such things as design and security) even if there are uncertainties!

There is therefore a need to further develop marine specific knowledge (to reduce the epistemic uncertainty) but also to use that specific knowledge when it comes to marine studies.

In short if you don’t know about the specific aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in the maritime domain, don’t work with trying to analyze the future in maritime cases and if you are to commission a study for the maritime domain make sure to demand maritime competence.

National conflicts lead to maritime security risks world wide

Shipping is an international business and most voyages (even the short national ones) handle cargo or persons with important international aspects or ties. This is off course the reason for IMO - an international business needs an international governing body.

The international aspects of shipping also mean that national or local conflicts have effects worldwide. An example of this is the international effects the piracy off Somalia has caused where maritime security has climbed as a topic even on national political agendas far from Somalia. So piracy off Somalia has lead to a new focus on ship security, but also that criminals in other parts of the world has gotten influenced/inspired by the piracy off Somalia.

Another example of how conflicts in one part of the world affects shipping in a seemingly safe corner of the world is the discovery (in February) of parts for military vehicles onboard a Finnish ship in a Finnish port. The military equipment was on its way to Syria. According to news sources it was an attempt of smuggling from Russia to Syria. Not only has EU banned export of military equipment to Syria, but having this kind of cargo passing thru Europe is also a security risk opening up for people to wanting statute an example.

At the same time USA has this week announced that they will support Syrian rebels with equipment. I have not seen anything about the transport route, but I assume that (civilian) ships will be involved.

The conflict in Syria has thus spread out to sea and with it risks…

A clear example of how difficult the arctic waters are

As I wrote a month ago "Arctic waters are a hotspot for emerging risks. We have tough ice conditions, possible new transport routs, oil and gas reserves, unresolved regional disputes and military strategic areas. Each of these conditions has unique and new challenges difficult on their own".

Now (reported by several sources, see for example the Economist blog) the arctic challenges has hit Shell, and their operations in Alaska, so hard that they already now say that there will be drillings this year. They plan to be back next year.

The problems Shell are having is off course a very clear example of how difficult the arctic waters are and how little we still know about them.

Armed guards, nothing new...

As I wrote in June last year there is a law on its way that will regulate the use of armed guards on ships under Swedish flag. The date for its implementation is July 1st 2013.

The problem I highlighted last year is however the same:

Armed guards “will now be regulated (and allowed) […]. Which of course is better than the current situation, but it won't really change anything as guards already are used on Swedish ships and most often picked out with reasonable care.

I'm however more interested in were the ship security focus will be turned now when the big former question seems to be resolved. I can think that one important issue is to educate people about how lonely ships are on the seas and that the security is limited to the ships security, there is no one else, no police to call.”

Almost a year ago I hoped that the focus would shift to more real aspects of ship security, they haven’t. Newspapers still reports about that the new law will change the situation and enhance the security, which off course isn’t true; the new law will not affect the security in any great extent, it will give rudimentary regulation on the use of weapons onboard.

Arctic waters, the next maritime security frontier!

Having a blog named “Risky business at sea” you have to write about arctic operations, and I haven’t so far. It is therefore time:

Arctic waters are a hotspot for emerging risks. We have tough ice conditions, possible new transport routs, oil and gas reserves, unresolved regional disputes and military strategic areas. Each of these conditions has unique and new challenges difficult on their own, combined they pose a daunting task that no one really take responsibility for and some won’t let anybody else meddle in.

Taking use of the arctic treasures (in all their forms) for many nations and organizations important, others are more skeptical. There are therefore several different tests performed to see how viable the wanted operation is. Big oil companies are testing the possibility to effectively tap in to the resources without too much cost; it is however unclear what demands we should put on the operation because we don’t know enough about the hazards. A few, but increasing, number of ships test the northern route between Europe and Asia every summer. It seems to be working, but there is no support if anything goes wrong and something will!

Russia has of course identified (and to some extent initiated) the changes. They have an interest in using these changes to their advantage, as any nation in their situation would.
Living in northern Europe I also see positive aspects in this change, but the amount of activity unleashed is frightening, especially considering how little we know!