ROV carrying explosives near Nord Stream pipeline

I've talked about tension and how for example the tension in and above the Baltic Sea increases and therefore also the probability of security incidents increases.

On November 7 (2015) an unmanned remotely operated vehicle (ROV) was found on the sea bed in the Baltic. It was found on international water, but within the Swedish economic zone. What makes this story extra juicy is that:
(1) the ROV was found not far from the gas pipeline Nord Stream going from Russia to Germany, and
(2) the ROV is carrying explosives.

This type of ROVs are often used in mine clearing operations (of new as well as old mines). In such operations the mine is first localized with sensor from afar and the detonated under controlled circumstances with dispensable ROVs like this one (used by many nations).

Unfortunately the Baltic is full of old WWII mines and unexploded ammunitions. Clearing mines in the Baltic (especially in the eastern part) is a long going tradition since Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became independent states in the beginning of the nineties and the Swedish Navy has taken part at least since the mid nineties as an exercise with an important result. However, the exercise became more political as a result of the Ukraine crisis even though clearing WWII mines has only friendly implications.

The relative large extent of mine clearing over a long period of time in the Baltic makes it very possible that the now found ROV is a left over from such operations. Therefore, the most likely explanation is that the ROV is a result of peaceful intentions. However, I've seen discussion on the internet trying to make it out to be something else. The point of such discussions can be questioned!

Swedish boarders has been violated at least 42 times over the last five years

Based on a request from the Swedish news paper Dagens Nyheter  the Swedish Department of Defence has released a list of the documented violations of Swedish borders in the air and at sea for the years 2011 to 2014. In total the list contains 42 incidents and 16 countries (out of which 12 are NATO countries).

The list is based on information provided by the Swedish Armed Forces and new a praxis in force since October first 2015 makes the information available to the public. This new praxis is mostly a result of political needs to put defense issues on the agenda.

The amount of violations has increased from three in 2011 to twelve in 2014 (not counting the submarine in the Stockholm Archipelago in October 2014) and so far eleven times in 2015.

Personally I don't want to put too much focus on the violations because every serious nation will train their forces and easiest way to do this is from your country and outwards, i.e. towards your neighbors. During such training an over eager pilot can easily turn away to late even though there is no aggression involved.

The highest number of violations are performed by the US, seven in five years. Russia only six during the same period. This in itself is nothing to get all fired up about and also Sweden manages to do the same to our neighbors. However, two things worries me:
- Russia does not acknowledge their mistakes which could lead to problems if there was a more serious incident; and
- the increased numbers of incidents is a proof of more activity and probably also more tension over the Baltic Sea.

With more activity (and tension) comes an increase in the probability of something going wrong or being interpreted the wrong way which could lead to consequences, i.e. there is an increase in security risk on and above the Baltic Sea.

Now easy to download!

The article Ship security challenges in high-risk areas: manageable or insurmountable? by Österman, Sörenson and myself and published in the WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs is now easy to download from the journal's webpage:

Liwång, H., Sörenson, K., Österman, C. (2015). Ship security challenges inhigh-risk areas: manageable or insurmountable? WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs.14:2. pp 201-217.

Safe at port or safer at sea?

Land is dangerous 1(4)
Personally I as a captain (of my small boat) feel the safest when the boat is away from land and the less control I have over the boat (as a result of for example bad weather) the further away I want to be (but a nautical mile or two is often for me enough). My respect for proximity to land stems form that I have seen the problems that rock-ship interactions can have, but also because I know how the effects of bad weather can be turned in to dangerous forces by the closeness to land such as when shallow water makes a seemingly small wave turn into a wall of water or when high wind speeds are turned into erratic gusts by land formations.

Land is safe 1(1)
At the same time I see the logic in rules and regulations that define port as the safest place to be. This is exemplified in regulations such as:
- the safe return to port concept for passenger ships (because a port is the only place where many people can debark safely), or
- when some types of work are only allowed to be performed if the ships is at port.

Land is dangerous 2(4)
My research clearly show another dangerous aspects of land. Ships are the most susceptible to many security threats in ports or close to land as a result of low speeds and high density of ships. Civilian examples of this include piracy in the Malacca Straits and off Nigeria and military examples include the suicide bombing attacks performed on naval ships (Hans Liwång, Survivability of an ocean patrol vessel – Analysis approach and uncertainty treatment, Marine Structures, Volume 43, October 2015, Pages 1-21) of which the attack on USS Cole probably is the most know example.

Land is dangerous 3(4)
Another example of safe at sea is tsunamis were you at port or even on land potentially is a sitting duck. However, at sea a potentially devastating tsunami may raise the sea level but can pass by unnoticed.

Land is dangerous 4(4)

Almost all (>90%) personal injuries onboard ships in the Swedish statistics from the years 1995-2010 happened in the harbor area and about 60% when a ship hit a man-made structure above water (kay, dock, bridge).

Consequently, I see land as a dangerous thing for boats. It is a 4-to-1 victory!

But then reality show me that it isn’t that simple
The container ship El Faro sunk east of theBahamas October 1 2015 after losing propulsion while attempting to get away from the hurricane Joaquin along the ship's route from Jacksonville to Puerto Rico. All reports indicate that the 33 persons on board died in the accident. Loss of power makes the waves much more difficult to handle which in this case probably led to the reported list and water intrusion through an open hatch. Therefore, in this accident being at sea introduced several uncertainties which this time interacted in such a way that the ship sunk.

Consequently I have to update my statement from above about land being dangerous:

At sea a ship is in its right element and even if something goes wrong you most often have the time and possibility to fix it before it gets dangerous. However, at sea the uncertainties are high and how and when depends on many aspects.

The land it self introduces several new potential hazards, however the situation or consequences are generally more controllable or predictable.

So if you like predictability stay close to land, but if you really want to use the boats capabilities be at sea.

Risk management when it goes wrong: artificial sounds on (electric)cars

All over the world (for example USA, EU and Japan) and there are popping up laws banning (or plans for banning) cars that does not make a sound. This as a result of the low level of noise from electric cars at low speeds.

The argument is that if the car doesn’t make a sound you will not look for it and therefore step out in front of it, but also that sound is important for blind persons. The speeds discussed are low, i.e. “parking lot speeds”, at higher speeds all cars make a sound.

Today we have a society where cars are all over the place; this has not always been the case and will hopefully not be the case for ever. Putting warning sounds on cars can only help in situations where cars are the only danger. In all other situations you still need to be careful.

Therefore, banning quiet cars is based on a technocratic view on safety and a narrow understanding of our world (it is not a robust solution). A more robust solution is to teach persons to use appropriate carefulness when moving around. If you can, look where you are going; if you can, listen for sounds that could mean problem; if you can, smell for smells that could hinder your activity and so on and then use the information gained to guide your actions (like lowering your speed if you lack relevant information). This robust solution will work for interactions with cars (silent or not), bikes (silent or not), lions (silent or not) and so on…

At parking lot speed I for one have no problem with stopping for a walking person (blind or not) as long as he or she is not thrown out in front of my car. However, as I biker I have a problem with people with headphones that, without looking, suddenly step out into the bike lane (because they also think, as many legislators do, that everything dangerous sounds a lot).

Do not try to fix a behavioral problem with a technical solution and I am hoping for a quieter future!

Insightfully written about assessing (security) risks

I too seldom push for work by others, but today it is easy. I had this summer the pleasure of reading Terje Avens article “On the allegations that small risks are treated out of proportion to their importance” in Reliability Engineering & System Safety (Volume 140, August 2015). I the article Aven take his starting point from two risk examples, one introduced by Kahneman in “Thinking fast and slow” and one by Joakim Hammerlin in the book “Terrorindustrien”, both examples deals with risks from terrorists. Aven’s point is that when assessing a terror risk there is no right answer. Therefore are terms like under or over estimation irrelevant (as well as objective risk). A terror risk cannot be compared to lotto or other well defined systems, because in such systems there is a right answer.

An insightful article.

This doesn’t mean that we should stop assessing terror risks, but we should understand the difference between types of risk management situations and also always include/assess uncertainties. But don't take my word for it, read Aven’s article instead:

Aven, T. (2015). On the allegations that small risks are treated out of proportion to their importance, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Volume 140 (pp 116-121).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2015.04.001.

“Sea blindness”

Last week I had the opportunity to visit Stavanger and together with people from Finland, Sweden and Norway talk about Maritime Security. The days in Stavanger looked at a broad spectrum of maritime security issues with a particularly focus on northern Europe.

During the visit we met with, among others, Commodore H.C. Helseth (Royal Norwegian Navy), Deputy Director International Military Staff, HQ NATO. Commodore Helseth introduced us to the concept Sea blindness describing a thing I meet too often:

Sea blindness: the society’s lack of understanding for maritime matters.

People on land take decisions in maritime matters, but without understanding (or seeing) how and why things happen at sea. I meet sea blindness on many levels such as from politicians, government bodies as well as from some ship operators (particularly those with another core business than shipping). I also acknowledge that I sometimes am blind to conditions at sea, but I hope that I then take use of people with the right experience and understanding.

Today at sea it's like if traffic on land were planned and decided by people that never had used a car nor bike and never crossed a street by foot, i.e. only seen it all from afar.