No one...

No one want to be onboard a sitting duck, and no one want to create one with poor design or poor operational decisions. To help in avoiding such decisions there is a thesis about decision support methods for ship security.

Risk-based ship security analysis – a decision-support approach

Thesis abstract

The protection of shipping does not come without hazards and threats for military forces, individual civilian ship operators and crews. With particular focus on security threats, this thesis is about how to prepare for such operations without introducing unnecessary risks, i.e., supporting conscious risk-taking related to ship security. It examines both civilian and military aspects of maritime security and therefore draws from the experience of both fields.

(C) H. Liwång 2015

Maritime safety regulations, guidelines and methods have a history and culture of systematic research, development and implementation. In contrast, international security is highly politicised and therefore less transparent. Unfortunately, comprehensive studies of ship security risk are rare. Moreover, applying risk-based approaches to security areas requires special considerations, and the limited research in this field has led to a knowledge gap.

To reduce the identified challenges with respect to security risk analysis, the goal of this thesis is to improve security decision support by defining an approach to ship security analysis. To increase overall safety, this approach must facilitate compromises between traditional maritime safety and maritime security. Accordingly, the objective is to develop an approach that is both systematic and gives the decision maker an appropriate picture of the security risks. To examine the requirements for a security decision-support approach, the work in the appended papers studies both threats to naval vessels and the security threat posed to commercial vessels by pirates.

The results of the studies can be used to further develop military doctrines and civilian guidelines. This study shows that the description and quantification of the (concept of) operation in the risk analysis is central for implementing both security and naval ship survivability. In addition, the crew’s risk perception, procedural safeguards and how the implemented risk controls are perceived have an important role not only in risk analysis but also in deciding the effectiveness of implemented controls. It is also concluded that only using expected values—not collecting and using uncertainties—in the analysis can lead to misleading results. Therefore, the uncertainty treatment offered by a quantitative approach is crucial for risk understanding, especially if the aim is to find robust control options or to support the development of a resilient culture.

The Thesis was defended in public on March 12th for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Department of Shipping and Marine Technology, Chalmers University of Technology. The faculty opponent was Dr. Rolf Skjong, DNV GL, Norway.

More information including extensive summary in full text

Sitting duck [Sedens Anatis s.l.]

(C) Hans Liwång 2015

The Sitting duck belongs to the family of things and is characterized by its helplessness and low level of protection. Can be found at sea, on land and in the air.

Evolution/history: the Sitting duck (Sedens Anatis) was first found in, and is still common in, the Anatidae (duck) family of birds. Therefore, the traditional Sitting duck is characterized by it being an easy target floating on the water, not suspecting that it is the object of a hunter or predator. During the last centuries there have been many reports of Sitting ducks in other forms, including artefacts, humans and other types of animals. Sitting duck at large is therefore today considered as a family of things and formally named Sedens Anatis Sensu Lato (s.l.).

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No one want to be onboard a sitting duck, and no one want to create one with poor design or poor operational decisions.

Should we in Sweden be surprised when we learn that there are foreign submarines in the Stockholm archipelago? Hardly!

On the Swedish politician's statements it sounds like the foreign submarine in Swedish waters (October 2014) was a one-time event. However, given the characteristics of the archipelago, it is very unlikely that this was and is a rare event.

Analyses of submarine operations have a relative long scientific tradition of successfully using quantitative methods. This started during the Second World War where especially UK drafted a very competent group of scientists with the ambition to win the Submarine War in the Atlantic. Under the concept of operations research UK developed methods to analyse submarine movements and behaviour in order to figure out how best to attack them (see, for example, the U-boats in the Bay of Biscay, an essay in Operations Analysis of McCue and Methods of Operations Research Morse and Kimball). This was the start of a successful civil and military research field.

Obviously, when analysing this type of event there are many uncertainties, but there are also some things we know with certainty, for example, about the Stockholm archipelago. If we use what we know about the archipelago, but also are honest about what we do not know with certainty, one can assess the likelihood of actually discovering a foreign ongoing submarine operation. Things we do not know exactly are for example, the duration of the submarine operation, how often the submarine have to surface and the probability for the Armed Forces finding clear evidence if they are searching thoroughly. Here I assume that a submarine operation is one to four days, the submarine is surfacing two to four times a day and that the Armed Forces probability to confirm the presens of a submarine is somewhere between 20 and 70 percent (given a foreign submarine in the archipelago). From the Armed Forces own reports we also know that two independent observations from civilians were required before the operation began.

Given the assumptions above and some probability calculations the probability to confirm a performed hostile operation is about 7 per thousand, but this figure is, as a result of uncertainties, not easy to determine exactly. We can say, however, given the assumed uncertainties, that the probability, with a 95 percent probability, is between 3 per thousand and 16 per cent (informed readers now understand that I'm not a frequentist, but rather a Bayesian). Not minding the exact values, it still can be concluded that it is very difficult, and therefore rare, to succeed in confirming an ongoing underwater operation. Therefore, it is even more unlikely to confirm an operation in more sparsely populated archipelagos or at sea.

Was this incident a one-time event, given the way the world looks today, or a common phenomenon that Sweden so far only discovered once? I don’t know. Also, how to comment on it depends on what we mean by a “one-time event” and how we define "today". We know that submarines have been in Swedish waters before, but it was during the Cold War and both Sweden’s ability to detect submarines and the security situation was different then. Therefore, we look at three different cases:

Assumptions A: The frequency of foreign operations as well as Sweden’s ability to detect these operations have been reasonably constant over the past ten years.

=>  The probability that this was a one-time event calculates to between 1 and 6 per thousand

Assumption B: Conditions, such as the crisis in Ukraine, has influenced the situation so that we only can assume that the conditions have remained constant over the past year.

=> The probability that this was a one-time event calculates to less than 0.6 per thousand.

Assumption C: The situation continues like it is now and after totally 20 similar years only Sweden till has only one confirmed foreign operation.

=> The probability that this was a one-time event calculates to between 3 per thousand and 1.2 per cent.

My conclusion from the probabilities above is that this was not a one-time event, but I can be wrong!

Allowing the archipelago of the Swedish capitol to be so unguarded so that it is virtually impossible to detect an ongoing operation is as if we wouldn’t notice foreign military airplanes until they are landing at the Arlanda airport (just outside Stockholm).

There is only one way to change this equation and increase the likelihood of detection. It is by constantly having (much) more presence at sea and more sensors in the water (as fixed installations and on ships, submarines and helicopters) while also having greater capacity to more closely examining suspicious observations. If Sweden focuses on this, the likelihood to confirm foreign operations can be increased. However, to reach a level where Sweden with high reliability can meet submarine operations in Swedish waters takes substantial efforts.

Given what we know today, the only surprise is that Sweden actually managed to confirm the submarine visit, it is a great achievement for the Armed Forces. The submarine in itself is not surprising and a single event like this should not alter our perception of the outside world. Estimates of how common unwelcome visits are must (as before) instead based on what the visitors have to gain in relation to what they have to lose (gain vs risk). Today, there is no shortage of theories about what the purpose may be and, as shown above, the probability of detection is low (i.e. there are many plausible gains and low risk). However, the consequence of a discovery can be very serious (if Sweden will use weapons if needed). If visiting submarine sailors are going here about once a year, it is about as dangerous as working on a fishing vessel. This, even though there is a small probability that a visit could result in death.

There are a lot more dangerous things that people do just for fun.

Conclusions:

-        This was most probably not a one-time event.
-        The risks for a foreign submarine operating in Swedish waters are low.
-        The military purpose of a submarine operation in Swedish waters doesn’t need to be substantial. As a result of the low risks the purpose can be no more than crew training.

Yes, safety can be exaggerated!

I know, you should not believe things you read in ads (see picture below), but unfortunately I have lately met several civilian and military professionals all used to dangerous situations claiming that:

"You should always chose the safest alternative!"

An ad claiming that "safety can nerver be exaggerated". (C) H Liwång 2014.

However, if that was true nothing would ever be accomplished. The scary thing is that even if I point out that choosing the safest alternative can seriously decrease the gain most stand by their first statement promoting safety first!

Most people I meet seems to, on a personal level (and maybe unconsciously), weigh expected gain against expected risk (however sometimes with very personal utility functions for gain and risk). For some/several government safety officials and military personnel (with a professional life that does not come down to a finical bottom line) this basic understanding for risk management seems to disappear. Can it be because they have lost track of what they are trying to achieve, or that the achievements are on such a high and/or abstract level that they don’t see them? Because, only if there is no meaning with your activity, only then does it make sense to always chose the safest alternative.

Piracy off Nigeria: Captain claims that Chevron and Edison Chouest (ECO) didn’t do enough

In October 2013 the support ship C-Retriever was boarded and two out of the crew were taken hostage. According to Courthouse News Service one of the two, the Captain Thomas, now sues the company for not doing enough to prevent the attack.

The attack came after other attacks on ships and personnel and threats of more attacks as well as after reports on security weaknesses such as how the communication was performed. According to the captain ECO did not implement sufficient security measures to deal with the risks.

According to the “Ship security challenges in high-risk areas: Manageable or insurmountable?” (presented on this blog earlier) preparing for such maritime security threats is not easy, but possible. It is not possible to entirely avoid risks, but given that there are high risks in the operations area the ship operators must analyze them and implement suitable measures of protection. How much protection that is needed is given by the level of the risks, but also by the costs of the measures. But operations where the risks exceed a maximum level (which at least for safety is quantified by IMO (2000)) must be stopped. According to the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) “It is important to recognize that the company is responsible for identifying the risks associated with its particular ships, operations and trade. It is no longer sufficient to rely on compliance with generic statutory and class requirements, and with general industry guidance. … It is for the company to choose methods appropriate to its organizational structure, its ships and its trades. The methods may be more or less formal, but they must be systematic if assessment and response are to be complete and effective, and the entire exercise should be documented so as to provide evidence of the decision-making process" (IACS 2012).

Therefore, in my mind the lawsuit comes down to if and how the company used the information about the threats in a structured analysis and then actually implemented suitable controls (and updated the analysis and controls as there were new information and the situation changed). However, the analysis must also take into account how different measures affect the crews', but also the threats, perception of the security measures according to the figure below. Especially off West Africa this is not an easy task!

Cyclic version of the ship security risk management. Of extra importance is dependencies
between internal and external conditions and the effect of risk controls (Liwång et al. 2014).

Also, unfortunately not that many know how a suitable ship security risk management should look like!

Liwång, H., Sörenson, K., & Österman, C. (2014). Ship security challenges in high risk areas: Manageable or insurmountable? WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs.

IACS. (2012). A Guide to Risk Assessment in Ship Operations. London: International Association of Classification societies.

IMO. (2000). Formal safety assessment, Decision parameters including risk acceptance criteria, Submitted by Norway (MSC 72/16). London: International Maritime Organization.

Strangers hiding in the Stockholm Archipelago and the perception of security?

Next week I’ll give a talk on a National Transport Conference on the possible effects of a deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea on the vital shipping to and from Sweden (Maritime security for Swedish needs?).

Last week in Victoria, BC (Canada) experts such as Professor G. Till and Commodore (Ret) L. Cordner at the Maritime Security Challenges conference made it clear that maritime security is about creating reassurance. If that reassurance can’t be produced the security situation deteriorates which will affect the shipping system. This is the basis for the research project I’m working on and the research questions are:

what do we (or the people responsible for Swedish maritime security risk governance) actually know about the influences and dependencies that create security and perception of security, and

how does different security incidents affects transports to Sweden?

The project was first presented on this blog in January 2014.

I think this is an important project, however the Ukraine crisis and increased Russian activity in the Baltic area has given the perception of maritime security I talk about a public voice. A week ago Swedish media reported about how the Russian Navy on international water gave orders to a Finnish ship with Swedish researchers to move away (which actually isn’t that strange, most navies wouldn’t like a foreign research team with subsea sensors in the middle of an exercise).

The Royal Swedish Navy performing sub sea work in archipelago waters. (C) Hans Liwång 2011. 

However also, since yesterday the Swedish Navy is investigating subsea activity in archipelago waters just off Stockholm and also being relatively open about the nature of the operation (fifteen years ago I’m not sure that the navy would have felt that they had anything to gain from calling a press conference on such an incident, now the situation obviously has changed). Subsequently, even if the maritime security in the Baltic Sea may be the same as ten months ago when I started my research project, the perception of security has definitely changed. An important awakening maybe, but one that is potentially dangerous to the modern day life in Sweden by affecting our vital transports.

So even though it could be the case that the conditions for performing safe and secure sea transport to and from Sweden hasn’t changed in reality, the effect of a change in perception may have increased uncertainties enough for starting a downwards spiral of security perception effecting the effectiveness which in turn put new challenges and uncertainty on the ship operators and so on…

How should we break this possible downward spiral? Well we’re back to reassurance, and reassurance at sea is produced with presence (on the surface, not in the air or under the surface). A positive reassuring presence that is reliable!