Better times off Somalia, but tougher for the decision maker!

Looking at statistics on piracy off Somalia and following incidents reports it is clear that we have had a substantial decrease in the number of attacks as well as pirated vessels. This is promising and thanks to more than one change.

The fact that much more ships has for the last on years enforced the measures described in The best management practice (BMP4) in combination with that naval forces actions has lead to that the pirates has to put much more effort in every pirated a ship. This has during 2012 not only led to decrease in succeeded attacks, but also a drastic reduction in the number of reported attempts. This is however not the end to the piracy off Somalia, but I think it is reasonable to hope for much lower numbers of incidents (compared to 2009-2011) for the years to come.

An important question is what this new level of piracy does to the measures used. I don’t believe that ship and cargo owners are willing to spend as much as they have done during the last years, some measures has to go eventually. These waters are not the only risky ones and money saved can be used for protection else were or used for filling holes in a very tough business. This raises a lot of questions for the future:

Who will take the first step and reduce the protection measures or anti piracy activity off Somalia?

When will this happen, for how long can we have a low level of attacks and high level of protection efforts? Probably for some more months, but not for a year.

Based on what analysis, only historical or also forecast based on the development in Somalia?

But also; what will happen when we will have a high profile ship pirated after the guard is let down? Will it be considered a big thing or just an improbable event happening once?

Understanding risk, probabilities, uncertainties and risk perception is central in getting this right and uncertainties and risk perception is of much greater importance than the expected average level of attacks. This is hard on the analyst, but maybe even harder on the decision maker!

China - a future maritme player!

The statement from Chinas president, Hu Jintao, that China seeks "to be a maritime power" is very much in line with my blog-post a couple of weeks ago about maritime security being a strategic asset of its own.

The fact that the international seas (together with internet, space and international airspace) are by the US classified as one of the four important Global commons central for the future of modern living is of course also noted by China. The global commons are at least as important to Chinas as to the US.

Chinas drive to strengthen their navy is not a new concept. But this most recent statement from President Hu Jintao, speaking before the Communist Party Congress, is as I understand it the first time an official at the top has spoken so clearly about a bigger sea presence.

I personally also think that the last years anti piracy activity in the Bay of Aden and on the Indian Ocean have showed the Chinese leadership that it is possible to play an important role on the high seas under the flag of peaceful intentions. This will give China access to information about sea transport and other activity at sea that can help them making better use of their industry and be an even stronger international force in the future.

Risk-based ship security analysis – an approach based on civilian and military methods

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF LICENTIATE OF ENGINEERING

HANS LIWÅNG
Department of Shipping and Marine Technology
Division of Marine Design

Abstract

The demands on maritime operations today are increasingly higher in terms of control, efficiency and cost. The margins for accidents and security incidents are therefore decreasing. In the area of ship safety the regulations, guidelines and methods have a history and culture of systematic research, development and implementation. In contrast, international security is highly politicized and therefore not as transparent. The result is that a tradition of ship security is not as well established.

The overall aim of this thesis is to propose a method for ship security analysis that increases the overall safety of the crew and the ship. The objective is to develop a method that is systematic in order to ensure that assessment and response are complete and effective, and that the process is documented to provide evidence of decision-making.

The method used is probabilistic risk assessment where quantitative analysis is central. The proposed approach is consistent with the requirements of maritime safety work. However, in the work here, the proposed methods are specifically tested for security cases. This is because hazards (without intent) and threats (with intent) evolve in different ways into risk. Therefore, they must be analysed differently in order to capture the causal relationship.

The proposed approach consists of three steps: the first step consists of a threat description that documents qualitative and quantitative aspects that together describe how the threat most likely will act in relation to the ship’s vulnerability; the second step uses the threat description to define the system studied as well as the scenarios that collectively describe the harmful consequences; the third step evaluates the risk with tools from probabilistic risk assessment.

The overall conclusion is that the proposed method brings the procedure and results of ship security analysis into the open and therefore allows for criticism, improvements and shared risk knowledge, not possible with less structured methods. The results also show that the calculated probabilities agree with available statistics, which indicates that the analysis succeeds in describing the central causal relationships of the scenarios modelled.

Reference data and full text (pdf) extensive summary.

The thesis was presented and discussed in public on November 15:th, 2012, at Chalmers, Gothenburg, Sweden. Docent Jakob Kuttenkeuler from The Royal Institute of Technology was invited as the official discussion leader. The seminar was held in English.

Maritime security is a strategic asset

It is no secret that international shipping is important to the “modern way of living”. Therefore is maritime security very important and big nations like USA and Kina are dependent on that no one else dictates the conditions for shipping on international waters. To be a part of, and have a saying in, the development of maritime security is therefore seen as strategic asset in itself.

But who rules the high seas?

I would say no one. Which for most is better than that the high seas is ruled by somebody else. The big nations want to dictate their own conditions for international shipping and not be limited by others. The piracy off the coast of Somalia has however shown that maritime security is fragile and can easily be challenged.

But, the Somali piracy has also given a possibility for several nations and coalitions (for example USA, Kina, Iran, India, EU and NATO) to show that they are a force to be reckoned with in the maritime security of the future. To be present on the Indian Ocean to protect ships against pirates is politically safe way of using your naval ships on the international arena. But at the same time you can get a lot of experience out of being there at same time as everybody else. The typical friend and enemy situation is not valid. You are therefore able to work alongside nations you usually don't perform exercises with and the nations that not often participate in international exercise have the most to gain from this...

I understand that it is expensive to sustain a long-lasting commitment in the Indian Ocean, but I am not surprised that so many nations are present, IT IS THE SAFE CHOISE!

Conflict between safety and security measures

There are several conflicts between safety and security measures, on different levels.

I would guess that the most common is the safety regulation versus security risk, were a safety regulation with good intentions is formulated in way so that it is too prescriptive (i.e. the intention is lost in technical details not always applicable) and makes procedures unnecessarily complex onboard. These complex procedures will then increase the security risk by making security measures hard to get in place at the right time and drowning security issues in administrative safety work.

Another one is the fact that safety hazards often are the same for the ship and the security threat. For example; making it easy and safe for the crew to embark also can enable the threat with easier access to the ship or sailing in good weather also makes it easier for the threat to come close.

In my research I come across a lot of these challenges between safety and security. They are seldom big problems and so far not a big problem by them self. Often the crew find ways to work around the problem and no changes are “needed” higher up in the organization. However, on a system level, these challenges between safety and security is a proof of that safety and security analysis is performed separate from each other and are therefore a symptoms of one of the big limitations with the security work performed today: it is not mature enough to meet the results of the safety analysis.

The only way to find the right mix is to do safety and security analysis in the same way…

Practice makes perfect: but what about security?

I’ve spent part of the weekend as boat stunt driver performing a live stunt/prank in front of a wedding party. The stunt involved high speeds, cold water, a big white gown and people (acting as the wedding couple) falling into water.  From the experience it is clear that you never get it perfect the first time, even if you are very prepared, and thought all it through, over and over again in your head.

So, of course professionals have to practice, over and over again. There are basic drills, but there is, of course, also a need for complex exercises as real as possible. I’ve some experience with military exercises and have seen how the stress in a well performed exercise can affect people’s performance, but also in a positive way what people get out of the exercise. Without the advanced exercise you are not prepared.

- So, you can create the stress, but is it enough when preparing for security threats?

Don’t you also need to create an exercise with not only stress, but also the terror you must feel under attack? You probably do, but can’t without deceiving people.

Probably you have to do with the stress, but also remember that even after many exercises you don’t really know how people will react…

Ships: perfect!

I like boats, ships, sailing and water. So beside cost effective transport boats also give me a lot of fun moments.

As a researcher I can also appreciate the fact that ships are a perfect research object, because ships to me:

-        are relatively well defined technical artifacts (not to simple, not to complex, not to big, not to small…),

-        operate in a interesting sub set of the world,

-        have a nice amount of crew onboard (many enough to be interesting and few enough to be understood),

-        are produced by a well defined industry (not to big, not to small…), and

-        come in many sizes and for many purposes.

These conditions together make research interesting, rewarding and possible. For much more complex systems a researcher can never deal with anything but a small part of the system.

However, ships and shipping is not a typical industry to study. The industry is inbred, slow, backward and governed by old truths. This is probably true for many areas of our society; the problem is that the backwardness and old truths are unique for each industry.

 

I’m therefore thankful that my interest made me chose this line of business, but I’m also challenged by the fact that I’ve to know the industry in order to make a difference. So even though ships are perfect, researching them is not for everybody. But I like it!