National conflicts lead to maritime security risks world wide

Shipping is an international business and most voyages (even the short national ones) handle cargo or persons with important international aspects or ties. This is off course the reason for IMO - an international business needs an international governing body.

The international aspects of shipping also mean that national or local conflicts have effects worldwide. An example of this is the international effects the piracy off Somalia has caused where maritime security has climbed as a topic even on national political agendas far from Somalia. So piracy off Somalia has lead to a new focus on ship security, but also that criminals in other parts of the world has gotten influenced/inspired by the piracy off Somalia.

Another example of how conflicts in one part of the world affects shipping in a seemingly safe corner of the world is the discovery (in February) of parts for military vehicles onboard a Finnish ship in a Finnish port. The military equipment was on its way to Syria. According to news sources it was an attempt of smuggling from Russia to Syria. Not only has EU banned export of military equipment to Syria, but having this kind of cargo passing thru Europe is also a security risk opening up for people to wanting statute an example.

At the same time USA has this week announced that they will support Syrian rebels with equipment. I have not seen anything about the transport route, but I assume that (civilian) ships will be involved.

The conflict in Syria has thus spread out to sea and with it risks…

A clear example of how difficult the arctic waters are

As I wrote a month ago "Arctic waters are a hotspot for emerging risks. We have tough ice conditions, possible new transport routs, oil and gas reserves, unresolved regional disputes and military strategic areas. Each of these conditions has unique and new challenges difficult on their own".

Now (reported by several sources, see for example the Economist blog) the arctic challenges has hit Shell, and their operations in Alaska, so hard that they already now say that there will be drillings this year. They plan to be back next year.

The problems Shell are having is off course a very clear example of how difficult the arctic waters are and how little we still know about them.

Armed guards, nothing new...

As I wrote in June last year there is a law on its way that will regulate the use of armed guards on ships under Swedish flag. The date for its implementation is July 1st 2013.

The problem I highlighted last year is however the same:

Armed guards “will now be regulated (and allowed) […]. Which of course is better than the current situation, but it won't really change anything as guards already are used on Swedish ships and most often picked out with reasonable care.

I'm however more interested in were the ship security focus will be turned now when the big former question seems to be resolved. I can think that one important issue is to educate people about how lonely ships are on the seas and that the security is limited to the ships security, there is no one else, no police to call.”

Almost a year ago I hoped that the focus would shift to more real aspects of ship security, they haven’t. Newspapers still reports about that the new law will change the situation and enhance the security, which off course isn’t true; the new law will not affect the security in any great extent, it will give rudimentary regulation on the use of weapons onboard.

Arctic waters, the next maritime security frontier!

Having a blog named “Risky business at sea” you have to write about arctic operations, and I haven’t so far. It is therefore time:

Arctic waters are a hotspot for emerging risks. We have tough ice conditions, possible new transport routs, oil and gas reserves, unresolved regional disputes and military strategic areas. Each of these conditions has unique and new challenges difficult on their own, combined they pose a daunting task that no one really take responsibility for and some won’t let anybody else meddle in.

Taking use of the arctic treasures (in all their forms) for many nations and organizations important, others are more skeptical. There are therefore several different tests performed to see how viable the wanted operation is. Big oil companies are testing the possibility to effectively tap in to the resources without too much cost; it is however unclear what demands we should put on the operation because we don’t know enough about the hazards. A few, but increasing, number of ships test the northern route between Europe and Asia every summer. It seems to be working, but there is no support if anything goes wrong and something will!

Russia has of course identified (and to some extent initiated) the changes. They have an interest in using these changes to their advantage, as any nation in their situation would.
Living in northern Europe I also see positive aspects in this change, but the amount of activity unleashed is frightening, especially considering how little we know!

Costa Concordia and two different safety cultures

I haven’t examined the details regarding the grounding of Costa Concordia, but it is obvious that the safety culture onboard wasn’t what it should be.

 

Reason (2000) defines safety as the “ability of individuals or organizations to deal with risks and hazards so as to avoid damage or losses yet still achieve their goals”. Reason also states that effective safety work needs experienced and educated participants that can navigate close to the limits of acceptable danger, without passing over the edge. Therefore safety is not only a function of technical measures in the design and construction of the ship. From Reason’s description, it is clear that many proactive measures are dependent on the knowledge of the crew and on the human factors onboard such as man-machine interfaces and watch systems.

According to Parker et al. (2006), a desirable safety culture does not just emerge; it is a result of many aspects. These aspects of safety culture can be summarized to define three basic areas of safety culture:

- Formal regulations and processes including, for example, methods for benchmarking, audit systems, and risk analysis.
- Competence and training including work quality and safety observations.
- Shared risk awareness

It is clear to me (and as it seems the people examining the grounding) that Costa Concordia lacked all three aspects mentioned above.

So onboard Costa Concordia safety was about fulfilling the necessary regulations with as little effort as possible (under the assumption that safety costs and that it is important to reduce the cost). Which is a common approach onboard ship’s today. Which is far from showing a shared risk awareness which only can be achieved were the crew continuously weighs the risk against possible gain for every alternative and make sure to take no unnecessary risks (under the sumption that safety is about taking smart choices).

If we instead look at the upcoming salvage it is a totally different ballgame. My experience of the salvage industry has shown me companies in a risky business that very effectively are weighing options and where safety is about taking smart choices. I expect that a salvage company without risk awareness will not survive long on the international arena. Salvaging is a dangerous activity and the feedback on the risk awareness is immediate.

I’ll would hope that more ship owners and operators tried to work for creating good safety cultures onboard their ships and not treating safety as a cost, but as an important competitive edge.

REASON, J., (2000) Safety paradoxes and safety culture, International journal of injury control and safety promotion, 7(1), pp. 3-14.
PARKER, D., LAWRIE M. AND HUDSON P., (2006) A framework for understanding the development of organisational safety culture, Safety Science, 44, pp. 551-562.

Finally free!

The 22 person crew from MV Iceberg 1 that was pirated on 29 March 2010 has been released. They had been hostages for two years and nine months and are now according to reports recovering from their ordeal and are receiving food and medical care. The ship is still under the pirate’s control.

In total 114 hostages are held as hostages by Somalia pirates. Out of the 114 hostages 38, from 4 different ships, has been hostages since 2010 or early 2011.

Better times off Somalia, but tougher for the decision maker!

Looking at statistics on piracy off Somalia and following incidents reports it is clear that we have had a substantial decrease in the number of attacks as well as pirated vessels. This is promising and thanks to more than one change.

The fact that much more ships has for the last on years enforced the measures described in The best management practice (BMP4) in combination with that naval forces actions has lead to that the pirates has to put much more effort in every pirated a ship. This has during 2012 not only led to decrease in succeeded attacks, but also a drastic reduction in the number of reported attempts. This is however not the end to the piracy off Somalia, but I think it is reasonable to hope for much lower numbers of incidents (compared to 2009-2011) for the years to come.

An important question is what this new level of piracy does to the measures used. I don’t believe that ship and cargo owners are willing to spend as much as they have done during the last years, some measures has to go eventually. These waters are not the only risky ones and money saved can be used for protection else were or used for filling holes in a very tough business. This raises a lot of questions for the future:

Who will take the first step and reduce the protection measures or anti piracy activity off Somalia?

When will this happen, for how long can we have a low level of attacks and high level of protection efforts? Probably for some more months, but not for a year.

Based on what analysis, only historical or also forecast based on the development in Somalia?

But also; what will happen when we will have a high profile ship pirated after the guard is let down? Will it be considered a big thing or just an improbable event happening once?

Understanding risk, probabilities, uncertainties and risk perception is central in getting this right and uncertainties and risk perception is of much greater importance than the expected average level of attacks. This is hard on the analyst, but maybe even harder on the decision maker!