Almost all attacks lead to substantial consequences!

During 2011 off Somalia (or by Somalia based piracy) about 20 percent (48 out of 237) of the reported attacks led to boarding or hijacking. This was a lower number compared to previous year’s thanks you several different factors, such as:

-          In 2011 most crews and ship operators had understood the seriousness of piracy and enforced effective measures.

-          The naval forces in the area were more effective.

(but also that all attacks (but one) was on a steaming ship)

So far this year about 65 percent of the attacks off West Africa has led to boarding or hijacking and in South East Asia almost all (>90 percent) of the about 100 reported attacks has led to boarding and/or hijacking.

One reason for this shift is that the reporting frequency of incidents off Somalia was high, in other areas the reports of unsuccessful attacks is not as good. But even despite this statistical error there is a substantial increase in the percentage of attacks leading to the worst possible consequences.

 

Worldwide pirates had a success rate of 50 percent in 2011, 2013 it was above 80 percent!

One could even argue that piracy in areas such as off West Africa and in South East Asia pose a bigger problem than what piracy did off Somalia in 2011. This because a high success rate for pirates lures more into the piracy business and also affects the crew’s negatively. Also, the fact that Somalia based piracy attacked steaming ships made the problem easier to handle, it is much harder to effectively protect berthed or anchored ships.

Therefore, the work off Somalia, often perceived as a success, was a special case that unfortunately can give the wrong impressions on what level of effort is needed to reduce piracy.

So, the work has just began and don’t let the success off Somalia fool us in think that this problem is manageable…  

Ship security challenges in high-risk areas: Manageable or insurmountable?

Article abstract:

“Piracy can lead to risks so high that they, according to the International Maritime Organization, are tolerable only if risk reduction is not practicable or is disproportionate to the benefits achieved. Therefore, there is a need for reducing ship security risks in relation to antagonistic threats such as piracy.

The aim of this study is to identify challenges for ship operators when developing their ship security management. Furthermore, this study also investigates two central aspects in the analysis; understanding the threat and understanding how a security threat affects the crew and operation of the ship.

It is clear from the analysis that the importance of subjective aspects beyond a ship operators’ direct control is high. This seems to be the fact for all aspects of the risk management process. The situation is also dynamic as the security risk, as well as the risk perception, can change dramatically even though there are no actual operational changes. As a result, the ship security management process is highly iterative and depends on situations on board as well as conditions out of the ship operator’s control.

In order to make ship security manageable the risk management has to put particular focus on methodological understanding, relevant system understanding and well defined risk acceptance criteria as well as on including all levels of the organization in the risk reduction implementation and on a continuous monitoring.”

Hans Liwång, Karl Sörenson and Cecilia Österman

The full article is available at springer.com, for more details see post Now easy to download.

An examination of the implementation of risk based approaches in military operations

Article Abstract:

"Today several nations utilise risk based approaches in military planning. However, the discussion on limitations with the approaches in regard to aspects such as uncertainties, the nature of the threat and risk to civilians is limited.
 

The aim of this work is to identify important challenges when applying risk based approaches to military activity. This article discusses risk based approaches in general and their military applications. Five generic quality requirements on risk analysis are presented from research in risk philosophy. Two military application areas for risk analysis: military intelligence, and risk management in legal assessments are analysed in relation to the presented quality requirements on risk analysis.

From the analysis it is clear that risk analysis is an integral part of the decision-making analysis and cannot be separated in time, space or organisationally from the decision-making process in general. Defining the scenario to analyse, including the time span, is a central task in risk analysis and will affect every aspect of the risk estimation. Therefore, the principles for scenario definition must be communicated and continuously updated throughout the organisation. Handling the uncertainties throughout the process is also important, especially if the aim is a resilient military system."

Hans Liwång, Marika Ericson, Martin Bang

Journal of Military Studies, Vol 5, No 2 (2014)

Journal of Military Studies (JMS) is an international peer-reviewed multidiscipline publication of selected Military Sciences. Publishers: National Defense University, Finland and Finnish Society of Military Sciences

 

The Swedish Sea Rescue Society

The Swedish Sea Rescue Society (SSRS) saves lives and assists boats at sea off Sweden for free year around without government founding. SSRS is of course based on volunteer work and a nonprofit organization. They also offers a service to their members where they can call for assistance before the situation turns in to an emergency. According to the society the preventative service is a way of thanking their members for their support which enables the society to continue to do what is most important of all, saving lives at sea.

As a result of a big navigational oversight from my behalf I had the opportunity to meet SSRS last year. The incident which started with much blood and physical damage to the boat ended as a rather pleasant and positive experience for the whole family onboard one of SSRS’s boats. After that, with the bleeding stopped, we happily continued the boat vacation (the boat did not need immediate repair, only cleaning) for many days.

Therefore I of course would like to share their video were a plumber and an accountant use some of their spare time to save lives:

Professionals or amateurs?

Accidents, errors and bad judgment happens, or as I posted a couple of posts ago: “Things happen; by chance, as a result of a threat or because somebody makes a mistake. This has always been the case, is the case today and will always be the case”.

At the moment I know almost nothing about the initial cause of the accident off South Korea were several hundred are unaccounted for and most probable dead. No matter the cause I’m surprised that it still (today with supposedly enlighten crews) is possible to misjudge the situation so dramatically.

Lifeboats are hard to use when the ship is heeling, that has been known for many years now. Good alternatives for passenger ships are hard to find. Ordering people to their cabins can’t be a solution. A ship operator must make sure that these situations are prepared for and that crews on passenger ships are well prepared and trained. I would hope that it is what one does in case of an emergency that seperates professionals from amateurs.

My writing, what is it about?

A word cloud based on my post headings (counting phrases instead results in the following popular phrases in my headings: ship security; security analysis; off Somalia; Costa Concordia; armed guards;and arctic waters).

What do we know about the conditions for maritime security?

I recently gave a talk about Civilian shipping in peace, crisis and war with a northern Europe perspective.

Europe is as all other regions of the world dependent on shipping for support of cargo in general, but also for essential goods such as specific types of food and medicine. Without this cargo the way of life as well as quality of life will be affected. This is clearly expressed in for example the US Quadrennial defense review report (Department of Defense, 2010).

Our ports are relatively stationary and can therefore without too much effort be included in the maritime security measures implemented by states to decrease the effects of potential security incidents. This is however a fairly new area to be handled structurally and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) didn’t get involved for real until the introduction of the ISPS code in 2002 (IMO, 2002). Also, the approaches are to a great extent borrowed from airport security which has its limitations when applied to ports and harbors. Therefore, there is still reason to be somewhat skeptical about the efficiency of the port security efforts of today and how much we know about how to assess the efficiency.

Shipping of today is an international business and a ship owner offers his services in the area in the world where he can make good money without too many uncertainties. The shipping in northern Europe has a relatively high quality because the money is good and the uncertainties are low.

But, in the event of a maritime crisis (or simply when maritime security no longer can be guaranteed) when there really is a need for maritime security efforts also including ships of the coasts off Europe:

ð  the uncertainties for ship owners also increase and the high quality ship owners will start operate somewhere else (because they can),

ð  therefore, the conditions for maritime security will drastically change, and

ð  we cannot prepare for maritime security based on the situation of today

So, what do we know about maritime security in time of crisis and based on which assumptions can we study it? Not based on the lessons from the waters off Somalia, that is an entirely different situation.

Refrences
Department of Defense (2010) Quadrennial defense review report. Washington DC: United States of America Department of Defense.
IMO (2002) The International Ship and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) Code. Safety of Life at Sea, Chapter XI-2. London: International Maritime Organisation.